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Bayes factors quantify the evidence in support of the null (absence of an effect) or the
alternative hypothesis (presence of an effect). Based on commonly used cut-offs, Bayes
factors between 1/3 and 3 are interpreted as evidentially weak, and one typically
concludes there is an absence of evidence. In this commentary on Warmelink,
Subramanian, Tkacheva, and McLatchie (Legal Criminol Psychol 24, 2019, 258), we
discuss how a Bayesian report can be made more informative. Firstly, this implies a
departure from the labels provided by commonly used cut-offs when reporting Bayes
factors. Instead, we encourage researchers to report the value of the Bayes factors, or to
convert these values into nominal support for the hypotheses. Secondly, researchers can
provide recommendations to design follow-up studies by examining the posterior
distribution of the magnitude of the effect size. Lastly, we show how individual Bayes
factors can be evaluated in the context of large-scale meta-analyses.
A crucial distinctionwhen interpreting the results of a study is the difference between the
absence of an effect from the absence of evidence. This distinction is typically ignored
within frequentist statistics, where ‘non-significant’ p values (p > .05) are incorrectly
interpreted as an absence of an effect (Altman & Bland, 1995). For this reason alone,
Warmelink, Subramanian, Tkacheva, and McLatchie (2019) should be commended for
reporting Bayes factors, which can quantify the evidence for the alternative (presence of
an effect) over the null hypothesis (absence of an effect), and vice versa. For instance, a
Bayes factor BF10 = 8 implies that the observations are eight times more likely under the
hypothesis that the effect is present than under the hypothesis that the effect is absent.
Similarly, BF10 = 0.125 (equivalently, BF01 = 1/BF10 = 8) implies that the data are 8 times
more likely under the null compared to the alternative.
To aid interpretation, cut-offs (e.g., Jeffreys, 1961) for Bayes factors have been proposed.
These cut-offs suggest that Bayes factors between 1 and 3 (1/3 and 1) provide only weak
evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to thenull hypothesis (or for thenull hypothesis
relative to thealternative; e.g., Jarosz&Wiley, 2014).Hence,whenconfrontedwithevidentially
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weak Bayes factors, the common conclusion is that there is an absence of evidence (e.g.,
Wagenmakers, Morey, & Lee, 2016), and the results are perceived as inconclusive.
The reporting of Bayes factors is still quite novel within deception research, though it
appears to be gaining popularity (e.g., Kleinberg, Warmelink, Arntz, & Verschuere, 2018;
Leal et al., 2019). We believe this is a good thing, but it does bring with it new challenges
for reviewers and editors. Using Warmelink, Subramanian, Tkacheva, and McLatchie
(2019) as a concrete example, we elaborate on the continuous nature of Bayes factors and
how to interpret them.Webegin bywarning against an over-reliance on cut-offs. Next, we
give some suggestions on how to make a Bayesian report more informative.1
Risk of cut-offs and reporting alternatives
As noted above, cut-offs have been suggested to aid the interpretation of Bayes factors.
These cut-offs, however, should be usedwith caution. Let us take the results ofWarmelink
et al. (2019) as a concrete example. In total, they report 22 Bayes factors. Nineteen of
these are between 1/3 and 3, and, therefore, evidentially weak according to the cut-offs
they themselves adopt. The remaining three analyses resulted in Bayes factors of
BF10 = 3.58, BF10 = 3.64, and in the opposite direction BF01 = 4.76, which were
interpreted to provide ‘moderate’ evidence. This interpretation highlights the main risk
of cut-offs: They encourage categorical rather than continuous thinking. Yes, a Bayes
factor of 3.58 provides more evidence than a Bayes factor of 2.8, but to say that one
provides moderate evidence, whereas the other provides weak or inconclusive evidence,
seems somewhat misguided (Wagenmakers et al., 2018).
The boundaries between the categories further fade away, when we convert a Bayes
factor into posterior model probabilities. A Bayes factor only measures the strength of the
relative evidence provided by the data, whereas the posterior model probabilities
quantify the nominal support for the hypotheses after data observation. To calculate the
posterior model probabilities, we combine the prior plausibility of the hypotheses with
the Bayes factor using the following formula
PðH1jdataÞ ¼ BF10  PðH1Þ
BF10  PðH1Þ þ PðH0Þ PðH0jdataÞ ¼ 1 PðH1jdataÞ ð1Þ
For instance, if the plausibility of the presence and the absence of an effect are equal
before data observation, then we set P(H1) = 0.5 and P(H0) = 0.5. Observations leading
to a Bayes factor of BF10 = 3.58 then yield a nominal support of 78%, P(H1|
data) = 3.58 9 0.5/(3.58 9 0.5 + 0.5), for the hypothesis that there is an effect, leaving
a posterior probability of 22%, P(H0|data) = 1  0.78, for the hypothesis that the effect is
absent.2 These probabilities can in turn be visualized using a simple pie chart known as a
pizza plot (Wagenmakers et al., 2018; see Figure 1).
1 For a comprehensive introduction to Bayesian statistics, seeWagenmakers et al. (2016), and for a primer on how to conducted
Bayesian analyses with the free software package JASP, see Wagenmakers et al. (2018).
2 Probability in this context refers to the plausibility of the hypotheses. For instance, P(H1) = 0.75 and P(H0) = 0.25 implies that
we believe that it is three (=0.75/0.25) times as plausible that there is an effect compared with no effect. Similarly, P(H1|
data) = 0.9 and P(H0|data) = 0.1 implies that we believe that it is nine times as plausible that there is an effect compared with
no effect after seeing the data. This can be contrasted with ‘chance’, which is a statement about the potential data. A popular
example of such a statement is a p-value. For instance, t = 1.9, p = .06 means that there is a 6% chance to see data that led to
the observed t = 1.9, and –more extreme, but not observed potential data – that led tomore extreme values of the test statistic,
that is t > 1.9, and when testing two-sided also t < 1.9. Typically, this strict distinction between probability and ‘chance’ is
ignored outside of philosophy, and the reader has to infer the meaning of ‘probability’ from the context.
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Now look at Figure 1. The dark portion of the pie chart corresponds to the 78% in
support ofH1. Imagine that this chartwas on the table in front of you. You close your eyes,
spin the chart, and at random place your finger down. Now open your eyes. How
surprised would you be to find your finger on the white portion of the pie chart? Your
degree of surprise is an intuitive measure of the strength of the nominal support for H1
(Wagenmakers et al., 2018). Our guess is youwould not be that surprised – therewas after
all a 22% probability of your finger landing on the white portion. Similar computations
show that the ‘evidentially weak’ Bayes factor of 2.8 would lead to a posterior probability
of 74% in support ofH1 and 26% forH0. In terms of nominal support for the hypothesis, the
distinction between ‘evidentially weak’ and ‘moderate’ Bayes factors in this example is
negligible. Hence, the categorizations are not that informative, andwe strongly encourage
researchers to discuss their results using the value of the Bayes factors or the posterior
probabilities for each hypothesis instead.
Again, we can use Warmelink et al. (2019) as a concrete example. In their discussion,
they conclude that Hypothesis 2 was partly supported and that Hypothesis 3 was not
supported.Weworry that such language exaggerates the strength of evidence of the data.
Ultimately, researchers should be fair to the uncertainty implied by the Bayes factors. This
uncertainty is lost when we focus on labels such as ‘weak’ and ‘moderate’, and when the
relative evidence is not converted to nominal support.
However, simply reporting that results are uncertain will likely leave many reviewers
and readers wanting. We see at least two options to help researchers provide more
informative Bayesian reports: first, by focusing on the posterior distribution of the effect
size and second, by relating Bayes factors to the broader research field by discussing prior
model probabilities. We will discuss each approach in turn.
Figure 1. Pizza plot, or proportion wheel, visualizing a Bayes factor of 3.2 as the proportion of a circle.
The dark portion provides the evidence in support of H1.
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Beyond Bayes factors: Examining the posterior distribution of the effect
sizes
A Bayesian report can be made more informative by studying the posterior distribution of
the effect size parameter.3 This can provide us with an estimate of the magnitude of the
effect, given that it exists, or provide us with information on how to design a follow-up
study. For instance, sayweconduct a large sampled between-group study (N = 1,000) and
find a standardized between-groups difference (Cohen’s d) = 0.1.With a default Bayesian
t-test, this would produce a Bayes factor around 1.5 in support of the null hypothesis, that
there is no difference between the two groups. Although this result helps little in
determining whether the null or alternative is true, by examining the posterior
distributionof theparameter, and the associated credible interval (theBayesian equivalent
to the frequentist confidence interval), one can still learn something from the data.
Specifically, that if there is an experimental effect, it is likely to be very small indeed (for a
pedagogical online tool to visual this point see https://rpsychologist.com/d3/bayes/).
Such a conclusion is considerably more valuable than what one can glean by solely
focusing on the Bayes factor. Furthermore, with the estimate of the effect in hand, one can
then efficiently plan follow-up studies.
The potential role of prior model probabilities
Another way to move beyond a simple reporting of Bayes factors is to use more informed
prior model probabilities when calculating the nominal support for hypotheses. In order
to calculate the nominal support for hypotheses, some form of prior model probabilities
must be specified.Above, for lack of better choice,wehad equal priormodel probabilities:
P(H0) = 0.5 and P(H1) = 0.5. That is, before looking at the data, H0 and H1 were seen as
equally likely. More informed prior model probabilities can be derived from large-scale
field-widemeta-analyses, or better still can be agreed upon by the research community. In
particular, if one has reason to be sceptical for the presence of an effect, the prior model
probabilities can be weighted in favour of H0, thereby correcting for false positives.
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In the context of deception detection, we have strong reason to be highly sceptical to
most cues to deceit. It seems that the research on deception cues, prior to 2003, is
compatible with a world in which there are no reliable cues to deceit at all (Luke, 2019).
Hence, in the best case, Luke’s findings suggest that only a small fraction of deception
studies lead to the detection of an actual effect – a genuine cue to deception. For the sake
of argument, let us say that only 8% of the published articles report an actual deception
cue, leaving 92% of the published articles reporting a false-positive finding. Thus, P
(H1) = 0.08 and P(H0) = 0.92. This interpretation of Luke’s finding can now be used as a
context to evaluate themoderate BF10 = 3.58 as reported inWarmelink et al. (2019) using
the Equation (1). A direct calculation shows that the nominal support forH1 of 8% is then
increased to 24%, P(H1|data) = 3.58 9 0.08/(0.92 + 3.58 9 0.08), which leaves a
3Note that the posterior distribution on the effect size is a continuous object, whereas the posterior model probability is discrete,
since we only considered two modelsH0 andH1. The posterior model probabilities allow us to study whether the effect is present
or absent. In contrast, the posterior distribution for the effect size allows us to study the magnitude of the effect, under the
assumption that it exists.
4 The idea to change the threshold of preference for H1 over H0 is not new. A similar idea was used in genome-wide association
studies (e.g., Clarke et al., 2011), where corrections for multiple comparisons led to changing the p-value threshold from p < .05
to p < 5.8 9 108. For more details on the relationship between the threshold of preference and type I error control, see
Gr€unwald et al. (2019).
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posterior probability of 76% in support forH0.Hence, there is indeed relative evidence for
H1, because the Bayes factor is larger than 1, but based on the posterior model
probabilities we cannot conclude that there is more nominal support for H1 than H0. In
other words, the relative evidence of BF10 = 3.58 is not enough to overcome the initial
scepticism brought about by Luke’s findings.
By changing P(H0) = 0.5 and P(H1) = 0.5 to the more stringent P(H0) = 0.92 and P
(H1) = 0.08, we now require BF10 to be larger than 11.5 (=0.92/0.08) before the posterior
model probability forH1 exceeds that ofH0.
5 In otherwords, we changed the threshold of
preference – the strength of the evidence needs to be at least 11.5 before we begin to
consider a found deception cue feasible. Moreover, we now need a Bayes factor of 40.77,
which can be verified using Equation (1), before we get nominal support of P(H1|
data) = 0.78.
Our aim here was to demonstrate how prior model probabilities can let us draw
important conclusions about the hypotheses and thereby provide more informative
results than simply reporting Bayes factors.Wewish to stress however that our suggested
base rate of 8% for H1 is only meant for illustrative purposes. This matter should be
discussed at the level of the research community.
Concluding remarks
We provided some suggestions on how to make a Bayesian report more informative.
Firstly, wewarn against an over-reliance on the standard Bayes factor cut-offs. Instead, we
encourage researchers to report the value of the Bayes factors or convert it to the nominal
support for the hypotheses. Secondly, we encourage researchers to go beyond a simple
reporting of Bayes factors. This can be achieved, for example, by studying the posterior
distribution of the effect size or by evaluating Bayes factors in the context of a large-scale
meta-analysis using Equation (1).
Ultimately, however, there is noquick fix formaking studiesmore informative after the
fact. Greater care must be taken before data collection to increase the chances of
producing compelling results (for guidelines see Sch€onbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2018 and
see Ly et al., 2019, on how to quantify replicability). Luke (2019) brought the
consequences of ignoring this advice to light. It seems that the extant research on
deception cues, prior to 2003, is compatible with a world in which there are no reliable
cues to deceit at all. Individual small-sample studies, whose effects may well be nothing
more than sampling variation, were over-interpreted, published, and, in worst case
scenarios, used for policy recommendations. It took some 60 years for this issue to come
to light in DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis. And almost another 20 for us to
understand the true consequences of this practice in Luke’s re-analysis of the data. One
can rightly wonder how much quicker we would have come to this conclusion if studies
from the outset had been designed to provide more informative and compelling results.
SinceDePaulo et al.’smeta-analysis, deception researchers’ focus on traditional cues to
deceit has waned. Instead, there is a new focus on interviewers actively eliciting cues to
deceit, (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), of which Warmelink et al. (2019) is one example. Rather
than passively observing truth tellers and liars, these methods consist of asking questions
in a strategic manner in order to increase differences in the statements or behaviours
5 A direct application of Equation (1) with P(H0) = 0.92 and P(H1) = 0.08 and BF10 = 11.5 shows that the nominal support
for H1 is then P(H1|data) = 0.5 and, thus, P(H0|data) = 0.5. Similarly, when BF10 > 11.5, we then have P(H1|data) larger
than P(H0|data).
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between these groups. This new approach may be a genuine path to a viable method of
deception detection, or it may be another dead end. If we do not start designing our
studies to producemore informative results, wemay need towait another 80 years to find
out.
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